Deconstructing Kavi: The Nation's Analysis of Thailand's Post-Coup Relations with the US and China

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Post-coup Thailand in the eyes of the US and China

Thailand's relations, both strategic and related to defence, with the world's most powerful countries, the US and China, are akin to a cat-and-mouse game - nothing is left to chance.

Huh? "A cat and mouse game-nothing left to chance?" What the hell does this mean? A couple cliches that mean nothing.

Both countries play a pivotal role in Thailand's security, as well as its political and economic wellbeing, especially in the aftermath of the September 19 coup.

The US and China have each taken a distinct approach towards Thailand. At home, they were among the first countries to congratulate Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, but both have greatly differed in their follow-up diplomatic activities. While Washington loudly condemned the coup, China was mute under the pretext of the principle of non-interference. An immediate ban of bilateral military assistance worth US$24 million (Bt818 million) was quickly imposed a few days after the coup by the US.

Did the US loudly condemn the coup? I don't think so. I think the US gave Thailand a slap on the wrist.

His notion that China operates from a principle of non-interference either demonstrates Kavi is a fool or a liar. Southeast Asia is traditionally in China's sphere of influence and China has a long history of meddling in ASEAN countries affairs. Currently, Burma and Cambodia are virtual client states of China. And what about China's "Go South" policy? Just because China announces that it doesn't interfere in the internal affairs of other countries doesn't mean that it doesn't interfere.

Speedily and discretely, China moved in to fill the void left by the US ban with a special assistance package that included $49 million worth of military aid and training. The good news was delivered to General Sonthi Boonyaratglin during his unpublicised trip to Beijing recently. At a time like this, China's new found power and influence is being felt deeply in Thailand.

In the previous paragraph, Kavi said that China was practicing a policy of non-interference. What the hell is China doing by filling in the void that the US supposedly left?

China has always had some impact on Thailand in one way or another. Its power and influence has ebbed and flowed over a long period of time.

Beijing continued with visits by several senior Chinese officials, mostly in the military and security fields. State councillor Tang Jiaxuan, a former Chinese foreign minister, will be visiting Bangkok after Chinese New Year to reaffirm Beijing's support of the Council for National Security (CNS) and the government. Tang has played a significant part in the Thailand-China friendship, as he penned the comprehensive framework of cooperation with former foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan in 1998, which subsequently led to similar agreements with all Asean members. It effectively signalled a new era of closer cooperation between Thailand and China after diplomatic relations were established in 1975.

What exactly do these visits signify? Would things have been the same if Thaksin was still in charge?

Of course, like a typical Nation journalist, Kavi depends on innuendo more than facts.

Does just a mere visit by Tang reinforce its support for the CNS or will he actually come out and literally say that he gives the CNS full-throated support?

Recently, Indian officials came for government to government meetings, yet India hasn't endorsed the junta at all.

I think a distinction has to be made between supporting a junta and exchanging ministers.

The exchanging of visits between Surayud and his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, could be finalised during Tang's trip. Beijing wanted to delay Surayud's proposed visit to China on February 27 or 28 to either May or June, with Wen's return visit set for the end of the year. Beijing's reluctance drew a shrug from the Thai side.

What is the secret code here? If these visits mean something, then say that they mean something.

So far no senior US officials have visited Thailand, except three former presidents, George Bush, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram was unable to secure a positive response from the US State Department on the possibility of him visiting Washington late last month. It was a big blow for him given the extensive network in the capital that he has been building for over a decade. However, the worst has yet to come.

What does this prove? It proves nothing. Personally, I think three former presidents coming to Thailand after a coup and not speaking out against it is pretty remarkable, especially when Jimmy Carter is considered one of the most respected leaders on democratic development in the world. If we were to apply Kavi's logic from what he wrote concerning the high level Chinese exchanges, three former presidents visiting Thailand could be interpreted to mean that the US is backing the junta.

As far as Nitya being snubbed, was it really a snub or maybe the White House just doesn't find Thailand that significant?

For almost three decades, Thailand and the US have been holding combined military exercises code-named Cobra Gold, which has transformed from a bilateral exercise to what is now the largest US joint military exercise in Asia. But the coup could change all of that this year. Decisions on the exercise will be made next week in Washington. Intra-security agencies will meet and review Thai-US relations and the coup's consequences. At this juncture, preparations for the exercise have yet to be called off.

Again, what is the point here? Is it the coup or something else that will get Cobra Gold called off? And it is only the possibility of it getting called off. How is a hypothetical scenario evidence of a rupture in Thai-US relations?

The coup's aftermath and the latest Thai decision to produce copycat licensed drugs along with subsequent negotiated compromises, not to mention the unfinished Free Trade Agreement, have already turned off some Washington decision makers. They are the same people who follow Thailand's abuse of Karen and Hmong refugees and the country's attempt to forcibly repatriate them. Thaksin Shinawatra's hiring of James Baker's law firm to lobby the Congress and the US government to advocate for his return to power will also increase anti-American sentiment over here.

Again, sloppy writing. Stealing intellectual property, an unfinished FTA that neither side cared about, Hmong and Karen refugees, and Thaksin hiring Jim Baker are totally unrelated events. Each problem has a different constituency in the US political system, and probably don't even register on the White House's list of major concerns. The question that needs to be asked: How are government to government relations? How significantly has the coup changed the status quo?

After a series of bomb blasts rocked Bangkok, Thaksin wanted to improve his sagging image and counter allegations that he was behind the incident. Ironically, he was identified in US Congress documents as the "freely-elected" Thai prime minister, rather than the usual "democratically-elected" leader. Thai folks tend to look suspiciously at the US government's growing ambiguity concerning the government and Thaksin.

Kavi should tell us the distinction made by American politicians between "freely elected" and "democratically elected."

US government's "ambiguity" toward which government? And "ambiguity" towards Thaksin in what capacity? Which Thai folks are suspicious of US ambiguity? The government, the right-wing reactionary intelligentsia, the country folk, who?

Washington-based Thai diplomats know that officials in the Bush administration and lawmakers are extremely disappointed with the CNS and the government for their failure to deliver a quick return to democracy and a business-like atmosphere. Media intimidation and Internet censorship has further rubbed salt into the wounds and will now form part of the annual human rights report on Thailand to be released by the US State Department at the end of the month. It will be more critical than last year's report.

I have yet to read anything coming from Washington that indicates that it even cares about Thailand. Thailand was practicing media censorship before the coup.

Thailand already had a horrible human rights record. Before and after Thaksin, does it really make a difference to the US? Except for the coup, what exactly has gotten worse?

And even the State Department isn't stupid. It knows Thailand can't jump back to its old constitutional ways over night.

Moreover, the government also shocked international investors and business communities with its capital control measures. With 35 provinces still under martial law and uncertainties surrounding the drafting of the new charter, it is difficult for Bangkok-based US Embassy officials - the same team that handled the 1991 coup with flying colours - and those from the European Union to defend their host country. The current government's performance pales miserably compared to the similar set up under the leadership of Anand Panyarachun in 1991.

Again, more sloppy writing. How the hell is the reader supposed to decipher this? What exactly does the highlighted sentence mean? And how is the reader to know what the US Embassy's performance was back during the last coup? How can the 1991 US Embassy team be the same as the 2007 team?

All of the above has not posed any problems for the friendship between Thailand and China. In fact, the coup was a blessing for China, as it can now quickly fine-tune relations with its most important partner in Asean.

I'm sure China and Thailand have their problems, but they just don't print them in the newspapers. Thai farmers, for example, are not happy with the cheap agricultural imports from China that are wiping them out.

I seriously doubt that Thailand is China's most important partner in ASEAN. I would love to see a source for that. I'd say that Burma and Vietnam are more on China's radar than Thailand.

Fine tune relations? What the hell does that mean?

Although the friendship prospered under Thaksin's reign, there was an uneasiness as the bilateral ties were too personalised and interwoven with his business empire and affiliated groups with vested interests.

"Friendship prospered?" What is the meaning of that phraseology? What is the evidence of this? How personal? What business empire and which affiliated group with vested interests?

Thaksin's attitude towards the monarchy does not help.

What does Thaksin's supposed attitude toward the monarchy have to do with Thai-China relations?

Obviously, Thailand-China relations are more resilient and adaptable to a changing environment, especially when it involves drastic changes of government. This is probably true of China's relations with other Asean countries and it augurs well with the shifting geopolitical realities of the region.

More horrible writing. Seriously, look at that paragraph, read it carefully, and tell me what it means? Thai-Chinese relations are more resilient and adaptable? Huh? How can you be both resilient and adaptable? How often are there "drastic changes" in either the Thai government or the Communist Chinese government, which hasn't changed in 60 years? And what does the second meaningless sentence have to do with the first?

China is stable. Vietnam is stable. Malaysia is stable. Burma is stable. Laos is stable. Brunei is stable. Singapore is stable. Indonesia has been stable for the most part. The only two countries in SEA that seem to constantly go a little nutty are the Philippines and Thailand. It seem the only shifting geo-political reality in SEA is Thailand. Kavi projects Thailand's instability onto other countries.

Thailand has tried hard to balance its military and economic relationship with the US with those of rising China. So far, it is has not been able to reconcile the two. As a competitor of the US, China is often more agile and seldom argues for diplomatic limitations as the US often does.


In the last 60 years, Thailand's most important relationship has been with the US, no doubt. China is rising and it's starting to flex its muscles, no doubt. I would argue that Thailand hasn't reconciled anything because it doesn't need to, at least not yet. It doesn't have to exchange one patron for another--even though that is Thailand's traditional modus operandi.

Thailand should made a distinction between China and US interests, which aren't the same. As China grows stronger, it will want to take back its traditional big brother role in Southeast Asia, which means that it will expect loyalty from its little brothers in the region. India, Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam will probably resist this, but they don't have the military wherewithal to resist the Chinese juggernaut. Those countries will unite at the expense of the US or in alliance with the US.

Thailand, as usual, will go where the winds bend it. When it feels the US is getting on its nerves, it will run to China. When it feels China is getting too powerful and meddlesome, it will run to the US. The US might get sick of Thailand's duplicity and move towards other friendly countries, such as Vietnam, which will resist any Chinese attempt to exert major influence on mainland Southeast Asia, and Indonesia(if it ever gets its shit together), which will resist any attempt by China to exert its influence in its archipelago.

My guess is that Thailand will eventually sell out to the Chinese and leave the US twisting in the wind--and will probably end up regretting this decision. I don't think there will be any consequences from the US because of this. Politically, militarily and commercially, Thailand is insignificant to US interests--unless it becomes a place where terrorists will plot attacks against the US. Recently, there has been no serious attempt by the US to contain China from Indochina. On the other hand, Thailand is important for China because it protects China's southern flank, and it can serve as a developed outpost, unlike undeveloped Burma and Cambodia, for China's interests in Southeast Asia.


The subject is an important one. But I think Shawn Crispin handled it better over at the Asia Times here.