Thepchai Yong
The Nation
When Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont meets with representatives from 44 political parties to discuss the newly-drafted constitution today, one of the most contentious points is most likely to be the article on the national crisis council. In fact, of all the controversial points in the proposed charter, this has generated the most heated debate so far.
Proponents of Article 68 believe it is needed to help break possible future political deadlocks similar to the one that precipitated the September 19 coup. The council would comprise the prime minister, the opposition leader, the speakers of the Senate and House of Representatives, presidents of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administration Court and heads of independent organisations to be set up under the new constitution. Their argument is that, in the event of a crisis, there must be a channel through which leaders of all important institutions can put their heads together to find a solution. They claim to have drawn a lesson from the political crisis that gripped the country for months last year when the then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra stubbornly faced a civil revolt. The 1997 constitution had no mechanism that could provide a political circuit breaker and thus made a military coup the only option left.
This is stupid. Why does there need to be stipulation in the constitution? Can't they get together and talk without the formality?
Thepchai is also a liar. There were plenty of options to get rid of Thaksin. See below Further, there was an election coming in October, which would have been the most legitimate "circuit breaker."
But its detractors see a hidden agenda. They believe that the constitution drafters are so obsessed with fears of a return of Thaksin-like political leaders that they will do anything to clip their wings. With the proposed council, the elected head of the executive branch would see his power to solve a crisis greatly reduced. It would also open the way for political interference from forces opposed to the government of the day.
This should fit into The Nation's myopic anti-democratic political philosophy.
From the very beginning, the definition of the term "crisis" has been a problem. While those campaigning for Thaksin's ouster last year (over charges of corruption and abuse of power) were concerned that the country was teetering on the edge of a bloody confrontation, the beleaguered prime minister didn't give the impression that he felt his government was facing a crisis. So even if such constitutional provision had been in place at the time, it would have been hard to imagine how Thaksin could have been convinced to see things otherwise. Given that the drafters of the new constitution sincerely want the proposed crisis council to function as a political safety valve that would help the country head off a crisis in the event of a political stalemate, they still have difficulty defining the scope of constitutional power that the body should have. How the council members can enforce their decision - if they can agree to one in the first place - is also a big question mark.
The Nation sees a crisis and conspiracy under every rock. Considering its past history, the litmus test for a crisis should be whatever Suthichai and Thepchai decide it is.
Of course, Thaksin's unprecedented power should serve as a reminder that there needs to be a proper system of checks and balances for Thailand's democracy to function. But that doesn't mean the contents of the constitution have to be based on fear of Thaksin's political ghost.
There was a proper checks and balances system in place. It wasn't utilized. I'm still waiting for The Nation to report how Thaksin undermined all those constitutional mechanisms.
The whole purpose of The Nation's existence for the last seven months has been to chase after Thaksin's ghost.
A political crisis presents itself only when normal constitutional mechanisms become dysfunctional. There are enough lessons to be learned from Thailand's experiments with democracy since the May 1992 uprising (which marked the country's political turning point) to ensure there is effective constitutional means to resolve political problems before they develop into a crisis.
Yes, we learned from before and the lessons were written into law in the last constitution. But nobody bothered with the law, because those who were politically opposed to Thaksin thought they couldn't legally defeat him in the courts or at the ballot box, which is why they pushed for the coup. If you carefully think about that, those who pushed for the coup are bigger criminals than Thaksin.
It's understandable why the judiciary has rejected the proposed crisis council outright. As far as judges are concerned, being dragged into making political decisions - even in a time of crisis - would do more harm than good to their credibility and independence. What they fear most is the same kind of political interference that effectively compromised most of the independent bodies during the five years of Thaksin. The judges have made it abundantly clear that they want no part in the new mechanism, which is essentially a political body.
What an idiotic paragraph! Thepchai says that the courts fear for their "credibility and independence" under the new constitution, which is why they don't want the extra responsibilities. Yet he says that they were "effectively compromised" under the Thaksin regime. Don't these morons ever read their own writing or do they just pull this stuff out of their butt and hope it sounds good?
Not only has the judiciary drawn a line in the sand, it has also questioned the rationale behind the proposed crisis council. It sees it as an anachronism that may raise questions about the motives of the charter drafters, amid charges that some of them are acting at the beck and call of the generals in the Council for National Security.
Another idiotic contradictory statement. Regardless, the generals have come out against this council provision already.
The charter drafters are taking a big political gamble by trying to enlist the judiciary to play what is ostensibly a prominent political role under the new constitution, hoping that it could provide a counterbalance to politicians. The judges, fearing their independence and credibility would be compromised, are also crying foul over the drafters' insistence that they participate in the selection of senators and members of new independent bodies. Now that the judges are taking a stand, the charter drafters certainly need to have second thoughts. And don't expect any kind words or sympathy for leaders of political parties during their session with PM Surayud today.
Redundant.
There are already enough reasons for those opposed to the military takeover and the constitution-drafting process to reject the new charter. There is no need for the drafters to undermine whatever support there is for the draft constitution with dubious clauses.
So basically he is saying that nobody likes this new constitution.
If the constitution drafters are confident that the legal document is the "best ever" for Thailand, it should already be good enough to have mechanisms necessary to avert a national crisis before it happens.
People said that about the last constitution also. And we got a coup in return.
There really wasn't a constitutional crisis under the last constitution. The problem was that those forces that were opposed to Thaksin couldn't change the government through legitimate constitutional mechanisms because they were politically weak. If Thaksin was truly corrupt, they could have taken him to court under the last constitution. Any bureaucrat or political figure could have reported him for not paying his taxes. Any politician or bureaucrat could have taken him to court over the war on drugs or malfeasance for his policies in the South.
Here is a list of constitutional provisions that were not utilized to get Thaksin for his alleged crimes.
1. The Election Commission--We will know at the end of the month the result of this investigation.
2. The National Counter Corruption Commission--Anybody could have lodged a complaint against Thaksin and the Senate speaker would have been obligated to mount an investigation.
Where were the investigations and impeachment hearings?
3. The Parliamentary Ombudsman-Charged with investigating wrongdoing made by complainants.
4. The National Human Rights Commission--Where were the charges brought against Thaksin for the war on drugs and the war in the South?
5. The Administrative Court--People who are victims of the government agencies had a right to sue them in court. Why weren't charges brought against Thaksin by the people whom he victimiized?
6. The Constitutional Court--Again, why weren't charges brought against Thaksin for violating the constitution?
7. Finance Audit Commission--The name speaks for itself.
What about recall? 50,000 signatures to send Thaksin before the Senate
How come all the yellow shirts weren't pushing for impeachment hearings?
On top of all this, there was an election process that could have gotten rid of Thaksin also, which was scheduled for last October, weeks before the coup.
One has to wonder why Thepchai and the other editors at The Nation haven't explained to us how Thaksin undermined all these checks and balances that I listed above.
5 comments:
Thepchai wrote:
It's understandable why the judiciary has rejected the proposed crisis council outright. As far as judges are concerned, being dragged into making political decisions - even in a time of crisis - would do more harm than good to their credibility and independence. What they fear most is the same kind of political interference that effectively compromised most of the independent bodies during the five years of Thaksin. The judges have made it abundantly clear that they want no part in the new mechanism, which is essentially a political body.
Then you commented:
What an idiotic paragraph! Thepchai says that the courts fear for their "credibility and independence" under the new constitution, which is why they don't want the extra responsibilities. Yet he says that they were "effectively compromised" under the Thaksin regime. Don't these morons ever read their own writing or do they just pull this stuff out of their butt and hope it sounds good?
You didn't comment on what Thepchai wrote. He said that the judges fear the courts will be compromised as independent bodies were compromised in the past. He didn't write that the courts had been compromised. In fact, I don't know how you could say such a thing, but there is no doubt that many "independent bodies" WERE compromised, which is why just for example the Election Commission is in jail.
A colleague of mine was an underling in the Counter-Corruption commission and to hear him tell it, Thaksin owned the lot of them out there, at least back then.
But wait, the junta didn't appoint a new NCCC. So the same Thaksin-owned NCCC that existed a year ago is still in place. The junta is fine with that, of course.
Al-
The contradiction that I thought was idiotic was that Thepchai said that judiciary said it thought its independence would be jeopardized by politicization, but the judiciary was already part of the political process under the 1997 constitution, at least when it came to independent commissions.
From 1997 Constitution:
The provisions of section 257 and section 258 shall apply to the selection and election of members of the National Counter Corruption Commission mutatis mutandis. For this purpose, the Selective Committee for members of the National Counter Corruption Commission shall consist of fifteen members, viz, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Rectors of all State higher education institutions which are juristic person, being elected among themselves to be seven in number, and representatives of all political parties
Here is the selection process for the Election Commission:
The selection and election of Chairman and Election Commissioners shall be proceeded as follows:
(1) there shall be a Selective Committee of ten members consisting of the President of the Constitutional Court as Chairman, President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Rectors of all State higher education institutions which are juristic persons, being elected among themselves to be four in number, and representatives of all political parties having a member who is a member of the House of Representatives, provided that each party shall have one representative and all such representatives shall elect among themselves to be four in number, to be in charge of the consideration and selection of five persons, who have the qualifications under section 137 and who are suitable to be Election Commissioners, for making nomination to the President of the Senate upon consent of the nominated persons. The resolution making such nomination must be passed by votes of not less than three-fourths of the number of all existing members of the Selective Committee;
(2) the Supreme Court of Justice shall, at its general meeting, consider and select five persons who are suitable to be Election Commissioners for making nomination to the President of the Senate upon consent of the nominated persons;
According to these provisions, the courts were already in the thick of things during the Thaksin years.
If it was true that Thaksin bought off the courts and commissions, then one can conclude that the court's "credibility and independence" was already compromised
Yet, ironically, the king last year told the courts to solve the political crisis last year.
The judges weren't bickering about their "credibility and independence" when the king told them to act.
And the courts actually nullified the election, and new one was scheduled, until the coup.
So even when the courts acted, the military overruled them.
So a lot of this crying over the courts doing this or that really is a lot of phony bullshit.
(From Matty)
"If it was true that Thaksin bought off the courts and commissions, then one can conclude that the court's "credibility and independence" was already compromised" - Fonzi
You said it Fonzi and you still won't believe it. You remember Thaksin's honest mistakes, his crocodile tears that convinced the Constitution Court, in a split vote, that it was 'honest' to have maids, cooks and drivers as multi-baht owners of Shin enterpirse, and there was no asset concealment?
Deconstruct yourself Fonzi the Ponzi . . . and maybe you'll see how Thaksin's money was able to compromise the courts, the senate, the watchdogs, but NOT Fonzi.
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